Wednesday, December 7, 2016

The Pearl Harbor mistake, and a lesson for Mission

I don't usually post on this sort of thing, but the Pearl Harbor attack 75 years ago today offers an excellent analogy for a danger that lurks in our most sincere mission efforts. As we honor those today who lost their lives while in service to their country, let us also reflect on the important lesson the Pearl Harbor attack contains for those of us involved in gospel ministry.


1. Background: The Attack


On the morning of Dec 7, 1941, "a date which will live in infamy," over 350 Japanese planes suddenly attacked the Pearl Harbor naval base in Hawaii. The surprise raid led to devastating losses for the US Pacific Fleet. The U.S. temporarily lost all 8 battleships in the Pacific Fleet, and nearly 200 airplanes, in exchange for fewer than 30 Japanese aircraft downed in the attack.




It was a violently successful raid, which by its very success led to strategic danger and eventual defeat for Japan. For most missionaries, if we achieved a "dramatically successful" ministry, we would write to our supporters in excitement. But how much thought would we put into how whether that success translates into long-term strength for the gospel and local church in a given area?

Whether through over-eagerness, by the desire to "see something happening," the decision to capitalize on a current situation, or simply wanting to bring all the resources we have to bear on a given gospel challenge, it's easy to only think of the tactical aspects, the details in how to successfully do a given ministry or activity, and not think past it to the strategic level, the longer-term or wider implications of what we're doing.


2. Tactics vs. Strategy


The Pearl harbor attacks were an excellent example of how great tactics can be poor strategy. In the short term, the surprise attack was a crushing success which severely crippled the US in the Pacific. In the long term, however, it was the event which brought the US into World War II, and led to the defeat of Japan and the other Axis powers.

Admiral Yamamoto, architect of the raid, had strongly opposed the war effort, stating:

“Anyone who has seen the auto factories in Detroit and the oil fields in Texas, knows that Japan lacks the national power for a naval race with America.”

As Yamamoto himself admitted, planning the attack was an act of desperation against a powerful nation with a greater industrial base, which he believed would eventually overwhelm Japan. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a tactical strike made in hopes to somehow achieve a strategic victory, to demoralize the U.S. or "end the war before it starts." On that front it utterly failed, however. While America's fighting capabilities in the Pacific were temporarily halted, the vast U.S. industrial capability was now focused into the war effort. As new Allied forces poured into the Pacific, Japan was not able to hold on to all the new territory it had conquered, and was forced back, to eventually surrender after nuclear strikes on the home islands.

It's impossible to know in hindsight, but it is widely suggested that Japan's chances of holding on to much of its captured territory would have been significantly greater if it had done everything possible to prevent or delay war with the U.S., rather than fiercely striking out at U.S. naval forces at their own base, an action sure to infuriate America and maximize popular support for entering the war.

From a strategic perspective, the longer Japan had controlled its conquered territories, the more resources it could have obtained from them, and the more industrial capability it could have developed across its nascent empire. If a direct confrontation with the U.S. eventually occurred, the Japanese could have fought back from a position of much greater strength with a widely distributed and deeper industrial base to support the effort.





3. The Lesson for Great Commission Efforts:

One Ministry's Strategic Failure in Taiwan

A book I once read by a former Taiwan missionary (whose name sadly escapes me, the book is back in the States), recounted a disappointing instance in the efforts to evangelize Taiwan. A large gospel operation was planned, and dozens of local young people were trained in sharing the gospel and sent out into Taiwan's countryside, reaching thousands of people. Hundreds indicated they were interested in following Christ, and it seemed the outreach had been a great success.

Some time later, however, when missionaries returned to those areas to see how things were going, they were only able to find a single person still following Christ. Everyone else, lacking any spiritual support and surrounded by the idolatry that had been all they ever knew, were absorbed back into Chinese folk religious practices. Like the seed in Jesus' parable, the gospel had been snatched away by the Enemy, or else quickly choked out by the weeds of idolatry which flourish so thickly in the Taiwanese countryside.

"Perhaps we should have planned less and prayed more." the missionary sadly concluded, contending that the spiritual darkness of Taiwan was not to be lifted by well-planned efforts alone, but by spiritual battles which had yet to be won at that time. (My own observations here suggest spiritual battles for the soul of Taiwan are still waiting to be fought by Christians and missionaries willing to rise up and fight)

The apparent failure of that effort, and many smaller ones like it, are one reason Taiwan has trouble retaining missionaries. It is a gospel field full of thorny weeds, thin and rocky soil, and watchful birds. I rejoice at the frequent news of the harvest being reaped a few hundred miles to my West, in cities across China. May we see similar things happen on this side of the Strait in days to come. But for now, one labors for years to build relational context, establish trust, understand the complicated variations which run through the subcultures of Taiwanese metaculture, etc. 

Things that work in other places often fail here; there is a spiritual bondage yet to be broken, but also Taiwan is just a complicated place. You have to love it, and possibly be a little crazy, to come dive headlong into the Chinese language and figure out how to share the gospel in an effective way when the majority of people consider ritual more important than truth, tradition more important than logic, and success in prosperity possibly more important than any of the above. Many incoming missionaries begin with enthusiasm, but after struggling to really connect with people spiritually, eventually move on to areas where people are more open to the gospel.

"Why Spend so much Time? Just Preach the Word"

"So then, why spend so much time trying to perfectly understand where people are?" you might ask (and others have asked, in my hearing). "Let's not waste time with all this, we're here to preach the Word, let's just preach it." 

It's true that hesitation or lack of initiative can hinder the work of the gospel, but the ability to "just preach it" in a way that is effective usually comes after the efforts of many other workers and ministers, and it also depends on the people to whom you're preaching having had their hearts readied to receive the truth, and understand the basic concepts you are communicating.

As Acts 14 recounts, Even Paul and Barnabas, going a bit off the beaten track when escaping from Iconium, did not start an instant gospel movement in Lystra with their preaching and even a miracle of healing, but were instead believed by the provincials to be Zeus and Hermes, and sacrifices were almost made in their honor. "Just preaching the word" didn't work for them; there must be spiritual willingness and some measure of basic understanding, both things which the Spirit can provide suddenly in a gospel movement, but often chooses to accomplish through years of labor by kingdom-minded believers in a given area.





Tactics vs. Strategy... Ministries vs. the Local Church

I only have a few years of experience in Taiwan thus far, and I'm sure there was an era in which higher-level strategic efforts were made by mission boards and organizations separately and together to see fruit for the gospel in Taiwan. 

Now, at least, I don't see a lot of thinking at the strategic level; most missionaries are focused on their individual ministries, which as I well know are absorbing enough to occupy all of your time and energy and then some, especially if new missionaries are not coming or staying. At that ground-level, tactics seem to be at the forefront by default, because it's hard to think of anything else.

For missionaries wanting to really have an impact for the gospel, however, strategy can't be ignored to focus purely on tactics; we can't just focus on the impact of our individual ministries without considering the wider effect on the local Church. Just like Japan lost partially by too quickly goading America into the War, whereas waiting would have let them strengthen their industrial base and presence in their new territory, when we seek to capitalize on our own mission opportunities in the short term but do not strengthen the local church by them in the long-term, we have not achieved a strategic success, and may even have made mistakes which will weaken the local church in the long term.

Perhaps you do work directly with the local church, so it seems like this shouldn't be a problem. But are your activities equipping that church to reach its locale and cooperate with other churches for the kingdom over the long term? We should always be investing our efforts in that direction when possible.

Good questions to ask ourselves might look like the following:


"For this new ministry we want to do, are local workers going to interested in continuing it after we leave?" 
"If we come in and make lots of things happen with our resources and motivated foreign missionaries, will this be reproducible for local believers? 
"What will this church we're planting be doing in 10 years? Have we built in a foundation of discipleship and mission from the beginning?"
"If we push to evangelize and disciple based on what we're used to, before we understand the local culture, will future gospel efforts be stunted here by having taught locals to do mission in an American way that's unnatural for them and the culture?" 
"How can we develop partnerships with existing churches to have a greater impact and also give them experience in this kind of ministry?" 
"Is pouring all our efforts into this one church helping the local Church overall?"

Or maybe more localized questions that combine tactics and strategy, like:

"For this meeting, if we do an invitation we might get some people to raise their hands. But by doing at the very beginning will we alienate more people who are just figuring out who we are in this community? Do we know what decision they consider themselves to be making?" 


"If we invite short-termers to get a big boost in the activities we can do, are we able to follow up well on that for long-term benefits to our local effort? Will we create false expectations in the people we're trying to reach with the gospel?"

It's not always possible to consider all that, and having considered it, it may not be possible to always act in a strategically productive way. But asking ourselves questions like this will help keep strategy on the radar, and Lord willing, prevent us from spending years with our heads down in labor, only to look up later and find little long-term progress can be seen after all our work.

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